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Abstract
From parole prediction instruments and violent sexual predator
scores to racial profiling on the highways, instruments to predict future
dangerousness, drug-courier profiles, and IRS computer algorithms to
detect tax evaders, the rise of actuarial methods in the field of crime and
punishment presents a number of challenging issues at the intersection of
economic theory, sociology, history, race studies, criminology, social
theory, and law. The three review essays of Against Prediction by Ariela
Gross, Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir, raise these challenges in their
very best light. Ranging from the heights of poststructuralist and critical
race theory to the intricate details of mathematical economics and
criminological analysis, the essays apply different disciplinary lenses to
the analysis of the actuarial turn offered in Against Prediction and set forth
both substantive and structural challenges to the book. By means of a
detailed reply to the three reviews, this essay provides a reader’s
companion to Against Prediction.
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A Reader’s Companion to Against Prediction:
A Reply to Ariela Gross, Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir
on Economic Modeling, Selective Incapacitation,
Governmentality, and Race
Bernard E. Harcourt1
Introduction
In Against Prediction, I trace the rise of actuarial methods in the field of crime
and punishment and offer three critiques of the use of accurate actuarial instruments.
First, assuming a rational choice framework, the use of profiling techniques may actually
increase crime in society under reasonably conservative assumptions. Therefore, profiling
may be inefficient to the law enforcement goal of reducing crime. Second, putting aside
rational choice premises and assuming only selective incapacitation, the use of actuarial
instruments may produce a ratchet effect on members of the profiled population with
highly detrimental consequences on their employment, educational, familial, and social
outcomes. Third, the embrace of actuarial methods distorts our conceptions of just
punishment by displacing a fundamental principle, namely that similarly-situated persons
should be treated equally regardless of race, gender, national origin, or other groupidentifying traits. For all of these reasons, the presumption in the field of crime and
punishment should be against prediction.
The insightful review essays of Ariela Gross, Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir
raise a number of challenges at the intersection of economic modeling, social theory,
history, race studies, and law. Ranging from the heights of poststructuralist and critical
race theory to the intricate details of mathematical economics and criminological
analysis, the essays pose important questions about each one of the three critiques in
Against Prediction, as well as larger structural issues about the book. In order to
accompany the reader systematically through the three critiques, I will address the review
essays starting with the economic modeling. I will also begin with the substantive
challenges and then turn to larger structural considerations.
It is rare indeed to have the opportunity to revisit a book one has written and
published, especially a book that has been the subject of such close readings and
critiques. It presents a unique occasion to clarify and reframe the written text. I offer this
essay, then, as a reader’s companion to Against Prediction.

1
Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Chicago. I am deeply grateful to Ariela Gross, Yoram
Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir for their insightful readings and critiques of Against Prediction; to Shai Lavi, the Taubenschlag Institute of
Criminal Law, and the faculty at Tel Aviv University for a fascinating symposium on the book; to Martha Minow and Carol Steiker for
detailed comments on an early draft; to Mariana Valverde and Andrew Dilts for comments and stimulating conversations on Foucault’s
Collège de France lectures; and to Pat O’Malley, Frederick Schauer, Susan Silbey, Tanina Rostain, and Lucia Zedner for rich debates.
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I. Revisiting the Three Critiques
A. Efficiency, Pure Theory, and the Full Economic Model
The use of actuarial methods—which I define specifically as prediction
instruments that rely on statistical disparities between group offending rates (Harcourt
2007a, 1)—may backfire and increase crime under conservative assumptions. If members
of the profiled group are less elastic to policing than members of the non-profiled
group—if they respond less intensely and are less deterred by any increased
surveillance—then profiling them for purposes of policing and punishment may be
inefficient to the law enforcement objective of reducing crime.2
In his essay “In Defense of Prediction,” Margalioth argues that this first critique is
technically accurate with regard to existing profiling techniques, but that the existing
techniques are error-prone insofar as they do not incorporate a measure of the
comparative responsiveness of the different populations. Though technically accurate,
Margalioth emphasizes, my first critique should not undermine our faith in the efficiency
of profiling techniques when they are properly administered. The correct use of statistical
discrimination is “always efficient in theory,” Margalioth writes. An argument against
profiling “may be justified only if interpreted as a positive account that criticizes the
current, misguided, use of profiling” (Margalioth 2007, __). As a result, Margalioth urges
that we not be against prediction, but only against our current practices of profiling.
Margalioth and I are entirely in agreement on this important theoretical point,
which in fact is the very basis of my first critique. There is no question that if we had
perfect information on the comparative elasticities and offending rates of the two groups
at the margin, then we could administer statistical discrimination efficiently and ensure
that there are no negative effects on crime. I demonstrate this in Against Prediction using
an economic model of the social costs associated with profiling and crime. More
specifically, I use a traditional cost function to derive the precise first-order condition
that must necessarily be met in order for profiling to increase social welfare by
decreasing total social costs (Harcourt 2007a, 133). I find that profiling will only
decrease costs in society—and therefore be efficient—under specific conditions relating
the comparative elasticities and offending rates to the comparative internal search rates of
the two different groups.3

2
The term “elastic to policing” or more generally the notion of the “elasticity of offending to policing” refers to the degree to
which changes in policing affect changes in offending. For example, an individual who is very elastic to policing will decrease his
offending a lot when he is policed more; an individual who is less elastic to policing will decrease his offending less in response to the
same increase in policing.
3
The exact equation is specified at Harcourt 2007a:133, but is rewritten here using a bit more English:

Elasticity

profiled

×

Offending
SearchRate

profiled
profiled

=

Elasticity

non − profiled

×

Offending
SearchRate

non − profiled
non − profiled
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To help visualize this first-order condition, I use the case of racial profiling and
demonstrate how to profile efficiently in one simple table (Harcourt 2007a, 134). I will
add a few identifiers to the cells in order to facilitate the discussion and reproduce the full
table here. For purposes of the table, EM stands for the elasticity of minorities and EW for
the elasticity of whites; OM for the offending rate of minorities and OW for the offending
rate of whites; and IM for the internal search rate of minorities and IW for the internal
search rate of whites:
Table: Minimizing Total Social Costs

OM = OW

OM > OW

OM < OW

EM = EW

EM < EW

EM > EW

[1]

[2]

[3]

IM = IW
(No Racial Profiling)

IM < IW
(Profile Whites)

IM > IW
(Profile Minorities)

[4]

[5]

[6]

IM > IW
(Profile Minorities)

IM < IW [OM / OW]
(Depends)

IM > IW
(Profile Minorities)

[7]

[8]

[9]

IM < IW
(Profile Whites)

IM < IW
(Profile Whites)

IM > IW [OM / OW]
(Depends)

The first full row of the table addresses the situation where both minorities and
whites have the same offending rates. Cell 1 tells us that if the two groups also have
identical responsiveness to policing, then law enforcement should not engage in any form
of racial profiling, but should instead police color-blind. Cell 2 tells us that if minorities
have lower elasticity than whites, then the police should profile whites; and cell 3 tells us
the inverse: if minorities have greater elasticity than whites, then the police should profile
minorities.
The second full row addresses a situation where minorities have a higher
offending rate than whites. Cells 4 and 6 tell us that profiling minorities will be efficient
and reduce overall social costs if the elasticity of minorities is greater than or equal to the
elasticity of whites. However, cell 5 tells us that if minorities are less elastic to policing,
then profiling minorities will only be efficient if the ratio of minority to white internal
search rates is less than the ratio of minority to white offending rates. The third full row
addresses a situation where whites have a higher offending rate than minorities and is
essentially the reverse image of the second full row.
Margalioth writes in his essay, “In fact, if we assume, as Harcourt does, that
[minorities] have lower elasticity compared to whites, this does not mean that racial
profiling is not efficient. It means that using racial profiling to target whites may
minimize total criminal activity (Blumkin and Margalioth 2006, 318)” (Margalioth 2007,
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__). Margalioth is absolutely right and his argument is reflected in cells 2, 5, and 8.
Notice that in cell 5—under conditions of lesser minority elasticity, but higher minority
offending—we should only target whites on efficiency grounds depending on the exact
relationship between comparative offending rates and comparative internal search rates.
The table demonstrates that, if we knew the exact comparative elasiticities,
offending, and internal search rates, then we could determine whether and whom to
profile perfectly efficiently. In this sense, at the level of pure theory, the use of statistical
discrimination is indeed always efficient.
Where Margalioth and I part ways, though, is on the importance to place on the
theoretical versus the actual. The fact is, we do not have any data on comparative
elasticities, and, until now, the social scientists who have been working on these actuarial
instruments have never paid any attention to comparative elasticities. From the very first
prediction tool onwards, researchers have based their instruments on comparative
offending rates as the outcome measure. From Ernest Burgess, who developed the very
first prediction tables implemented in the twentieth century, to the DEA agents who
developed the drug-courier profile in the 1970s, to the most up-to-date sexual offender
risk assessment instruments—all of the profiling instruments are based on offending
differentials only. In other words, throughout the twentieth century and now into the
twenty-first, actuarial methods are tied to differences in offending rates. The actuarial
research—practical and theoretical—has never measured comparative elasticities. The
result is that, today, we know effectively nothing about comparative elasticities.4
It is precisely for this reason that I defined “actuarial methods” narrowly and
specifically at the outset of Against Prediction as the “use of statistical rather than clinical
methods on large datasets to determine different levels of criminal offending associated
with one or more group traits, in order (1) to predict past, present, or future criminal
behavior and (2) to administer a criminal justice outcome” (Harcourt 2007a, 1, emphasis
added). This definition reflects, most accurately, what actuarial methods mean today and
for the foreseeable future.
The pure theory of statistical discrimination is so divorced from our current state
of knowledge and from our existing profiling techniques that the more meaningful
conclusion to draw is that our actuarial instruments are potentially inefficient. Today and
for the foreseeable future, we should remain against prediction.

4
It is only within the time frame of the writing of this book and the earlier articles from which it grew (Harcourt 2004, 2003a, and
2003b) that researchers have begun to consider the implication of comparative elasticities to profiling. At the theoretical level, Nicola
Persico raised the possibility of inefficiency in an article in 2002 (Persico 2002), but only recently have comparative elasticities begun
to be included in the mathematical models (Harcourt 2004; Dominitz and Knowles 2005; Blumkin and Margalioth 2006; Bjerk 2007).
At the empirical level, Avner Bar-Ilan and Bruce Sacerdote have a working paper from 2001 that explores the comparative
responsiveness to an increase in the fine for running a red light along several dimensions—finding that the elasticity of red light
running with respect to the fine “is larger for younger drivers and drivers with older cars,” equivalent for drivers “convicted of violent
offenses or property offenses,” and smallest, within Israel, for “members of ethnic minority groups.” In addition, Paul Heaton has a
2006 working paper on the effect of eliminating racial profiling policies in New Jersey on the offending of minorities; however, the
policing intervention in New Jersey involved no de-policing of whites, so there is no proper way to assess how the elasticity of black
offenders compared to that of whites. The bottom line is that we still do not know anything about real comparative elasticities in the
United States.
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These remarks help clarify two other important points that Margalioth raises in his
essay. First, as Margalioth writes, “The difference in group size is irrelevant” (Margalioth
2007, __). Margalioth is right and if there is anything in Against Prediction that suggests
otherwise, it is the inadvertent product of trying to make the proofs accessible without
using calculus.5 Group size does not matter to the first-order condition for efficiency.
This should be evident from the equation and the table reproduced above: there is nothing
in the equation or in the table that goes to the relative sizes of the populations. If there is
any confusion in the text of Against Prediction, I would like to clarify the point here:
Group size does not matter.
Second, as I emphasize in the text, I do not know how the elasticies compare as
between minorities and whites—or for that matter as between any two groups in society.6
This is, as Margalioth suggests, an “open question” as an empirical matter. My purpose in
the text is not to claim that profiled groups have lower elasticity, but rather to suggest that
there are common sense reasons to suspect that a group with a higher offending rate may
also have lower elasticity than the general population. The reasons are that there may be
antecedent conditions—socio-economic, education-related, familial, cultural or other—
that explain both the higher offending and any potential difference in elasticity. This is,
however, a theoretical claim for which there is at present no empirical evidence—which
is precisely the problem.
B. The “Ratchet Effect,” Selective Incapacitation, and Social Engineering
If we put aside for a moment all rational choice assumptions and imagine that
people are perfectly inelastic to policing, then the use of actuarial methods will be an
efficient means to detect more crime. Profiling will increase the effectiveness of policing
and punishing. But these benefits come at a price: the use of actuarial methods will cause
a “ratchet effect” on the profiled population, such that members of the profiled group will
be overrepresented in terms of carceral contacts (arrests, searches, detentions,
convictions, incarcerations) in relation to their representation in the offending population.
The basic intuition is that policing is like sampling: when the police profile
higher-offending individuals, they are effectively sampling more from that higheroffending group. The resulting set of successful searches will contain a disproportionate
number of those high-offending individuals—disproportionate as compared to their
representation in the offending population. This imbalance will get incrementally worse
each year if law enforcement departments rely on the evidence of last year’s correctional
5
Margalioth is right that I do discuss group size in some of the early models on pages 126 and 131 and in Appendix B. The reason
is that, in those models, I am using real (though hypothetical) numbers to make the analysis clear to the lay reader. I was trying to
avoid using calculus as much as possible to make the proofs more accessible, and those early models therefore use actual numbers and
proportions. But in the formal and exact model that uses derivatives, it is clear that the proportional size of the groups does not matter
to the first-order condition for efficiency.
6
This is especially true in the context of profiling as a counter-terrorism measure. As I discuss in Against Prediction (2007a, 227236) and develop at further length in “Muslim Profiles Post 9/11” (Harcourt 2007d), it is extremely difficult to know how the
elasticities of different groups compare in the terrorism context. The efficiency of profiling will turn on whether any immediate gains
from profiling will be offset by long-term substitution effects—i.e. by whether terrorist organizations can recruit from outside the
profiled group—but those long-term effects are extremely hard to predict precisely because of the uncertainty surrounding the
comparative elasticities.
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traces—arrest or conviction rates—in order to set next year’s profiling targets. The
resulting ratchet effect will have significant detrimental consequences on the
employment, educational, familial, and social outcomes of the profiled populations—
including, in the case of racial profiling, the devastating effects associated with the notion
of Black criminality that pervades the public imagination (Roberts 1999, 805) and, in the
case of recidivists, the extreme difficulties of prisoner reentry (Travis 2000). The high
costs associated with any ratchet effect should temper our embrace of the actuarial.
None of the review essays challenges the idea of a ratchet under conditions of
non-elasticity. Margalioth correctly observes that if the populations are completely
inelastic, then a perfectly efficient police officer would always and exclusively want to
search members of the higher-offending group. On efficiency grounds, the police would
not ratchet up, but rather search only the profiled population. Margalioth is right that this
would eliminate subsequent ratchets—in other words, that it would eliminate subsequent
ratchets as incremental processes operating over time. It would not, however, eliminate a
one-time ratchet that would create the full disparity. As a result, the consequences are
similar. Whether the ratchet occurs in one period only or over time, it would create a
stark imbalance between the offending and carceral distributions with detrimental effects
on the profiled population.
In his essay “Against Prevention?”, however, Sapir does urge me to go further in
my critique. Sapir argues that if we assume that the predictions are accurate—a point I
will return to later—then we may need additional arguments against selective
incapacitation. “If it does in fact work and if we can predict who is likely to re-offend,”
Sapir asks, “is it not legitimate to put them away for a longer period of time? Don’t we
need more robust reasons to be opposed to selective incapacitation?” (Sapir 2007, __).
Sapir offers two additional reasons. The first is that incapacitation punishes for
suspicious traits and future acts, rather than for the past criminal act itself: “we do not
punish people for wrongs they did, but we make them suffer for possessing certain traits
or belonging to certain groups” (Sapir 2007, __). I agree with this first argument and
believe that it is reflected in my third critique—namely that actuarial methods distort our
fundamental principle that equally situated persons should be treated alike. Selective
incapacitation no longer treats offenders as equals for having committed a crime, but
instead looks at group traits—race, prior record, family background—to determine
similarity. Like Sapir, I find this deeply troubling.
Sapir’s second argument is that incapacitation amounts to “the State’s shirking its
responsibility to deal with the causes of crime” (Sapir 2007: __). The turn to actuarial
methods and selective incapacitation, Sapir notes, is “a reflection of the fact that we have
given up on trying to reduce crime by investing in job opportunities, education, assistance
to immigrants, drug rehabilitation programs, reentry programs and the like. We have also
given up on punitive measures that keep the offender in the community” (Sapir 2007:__).
On this score, I must confess, I am no longer convinced that the state is in a strong
position to identify properly the causes of crime or to propose the kinds of solutions that I
might agree with. I have become increasingly skeptical of our ability to empirically verify
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criminological and punishment theories, especially those that intermediate through
human consciousness, such as deterrence and rehabilitation theories, as well as social
influence and legitimacy theories. I have found that even the most technical and savvy
statistical analyses, econometric models, and qualitative research often fall short of their
stated conclusions (Harcourt 2006b, Chapter 14). I have sketched out my increasing
skepticism about the role of scientific discourse in the field of crime and punishment in a
recent essay titled Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment (Harcourt 2006a). In the
essay, I suggest that our lack of empirical knowledge should chasten our crime and
punishment claims, and make us perhaps rely more on chance and randomization. I will
not elaborate those points further here, but suggest only that they raise serious doubts
about the ability of the state to properly identify and deal with the causes of crime. The
track record, as I see it, is abysmal. This leaves me favoring less rather than more
government intervention in the crime and punishment area across the board—not only as
it relates to the actuarial turn (or, as I have argued elsewhere, to order-maintenance), but
also as it relates to community-based punishment practices as well as larger public
policies that are justified on the basis of crime-fighting. I am deeply concerned that the
rhetoric of fighting crime is far too powerful a tool and tends to exercise too much
justificatory force.
Though we may disagree here, the exchange with Sapir elucidates two corollary
but important points. First, my second critique involves a cost-benefit analysis and, as a
result, it requires that we carefully calibrate our conclusions to any potential benefits.
Some benefits may be so great that we may be willing to pay the price of a ratchet. It is
for this reason that I make a distinction based on the egregiousness of the criminal
offense. Sapir is undoubtedly right that the category of “heinous and egregious crimes” is
theoretically problematic and ideologically loaded. But that, I take it, is inevitable and it
points to our responsibility, as ethical and political agents, to properly police those
ideological lines.7
Second, Sapir draws our attention to the distinction between punishment and
regulatory prevention, and asks why Against Prediction is limited to punishment only.
This is an important intervention. My three critiques of prediction do indeed extend
beyond the penal sphere to the area of preventative detention and civil commitment, and I
discuss the case of violent sexual predators (Harcourt 2007a, 14). The first two critiques
operate in exactly the same fashion, and the third critique is also perfectly relevant as
long as we are willing to question—as I and others, including Sapir and Carol Steiker
(1997) are—the jurisprudential distinction between preventative, administrative practices
and punitive sanctions. Once again, the harms may need to be recalibrated in the event
that they are any less severe, but the analytic framework applies flawlessly.

7
In contrast to the “ratchet effect” critique, the first critique addresses only the purported efficiency benefits of profiling
(assuming a rational choice framework and deterrence) and demonstrates that those benefits themselves may be elusive. It does not
reach the next stage of a cost-benefit analysis and does not assess potential costs, since it offers an internal critique of the law
enforcement rationale for profiling. The third critique—which I discuss next—includes a normative argument about just punishment.
There is no reason, though, that a consequentialist thinker could not assess the third critique through a cost-benefit lens. Not everyone
will want to do so—especially not deontologists or social theorists—but it is not impervious to a cost-benefit analysis. For these
reasons, the egregiousness of the criminal offense is potentially relevant to all three critiques.
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C. Distorting Our Conception of Just Punishment: Foucault on Discipline,
Governmentality, and Power/Knowledge
If profiling is potentially inefficient or alternatively may come at too high a price,
then how exactly did actuarial instruments develop such traction in the field of crime and
punishment? Why have they begun to colonize our thinking and practices of policing and
punishing? The answer is complex but tied to what I call “the pull of prediction”: our
technical advances in the ability to collect data, categorize, compute, and predict have
seduced us into believing that future dangerousness is at the core of just punishment. Our
desire to know the criminal, to categorize him and insure against future risk has led us to
embrace the actuarial turn and, in the process, has displaced a fundamental tenet of just
punishment, namely that similarly-situated persons should be treated equally regardless
of their membership in any particular ethnic, racial, or other group.
Gross, in her essay “History, Race and Prediction,” and Sapir urge me to locate
this third critique more explicitly within the Foucauldian models of discipline and
governmentality. “Foucault, who was so present in Harcourt’s first book, lies only
beneath the surface in Against Prediction,” Sapir writes, and “a more explicit engagement
with Foucault” would have helped decipher the links between, inter alia, actuarial and
clinical methods (Sapir 2007,__). Gross outlines how the actuarial turn in crime and
punishment could be located within the context of “changing thinking about risk in a
variety of fields of law” and suggests that these changes can be usefully analyzed from “a
Foucauldian perspective” (Gross 2007,__).
It is indeed important to relate “the pull of prediction” back to Michel Foucault’s
work, if only to shed light on the unique and theoretically ambiguous nature of the
actuarial turn. The truth is, the actuarial fits uncomfortably in the two dominant
Foucauldian frameworks—discipline and governmentality. The first model, brilliantly
developed in Discipline and Punish, serves well to interpret and analyze the rehabilitative
project that blossomed in corrections through the mid-twentieth century. Discipline,
which was trained on the soul of the individual and sought to transform, reshape, and
correct the delinquent—after, naturally, having constructed the delinquent—was
intimately connected with the actuarial project. As I emphasize in Against Prediction, the
actuarial impulse grew precisely from a desire to know the individual offender better and
to administer an individual outcome with greater precision, in the context of both “the
individualization of punishment”—to borrow the title of Raymond Saleilles’ famous
1898 monograph—and the advent of indeterminate sentencing, parole boards, and the
turn to rehabilitation (Harcourt 2007a, 42-45). The actuarial emerged first in the parole
context as a way to assess whether a particular prisoner was likely to have been
rehabilitated and could be paroled safely. Actuarial instruments were a central component
of the individualization of punishment—which is vital to the third critique because I
would like to suggest, contra Frederick Schauer (2003), that the actuarial was not about a
preference for the general over the particular. To the contrary, it fed perfectly into the
disciplinary project to “control the individual, neutralize his dangerousness, modify his
criminal dispositions, and to only stop when those effects have been achieved” (Foucault
1975, 23).
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But the actuarial fits uncomfortably in the disciplinary framework because it no
longer seeks to normalize the delinquent in the same manner. There are also important
differences with regard to the role of the judge. At the height of the disciplinary, the
judge no longer simply determined guilt, but instead embodied a wide range of expertise
from psychiatry, to counseling, to social work, to education, administration, and
correction, and took responsibility for the soul of the convict (Foucault 1975, 22-27).
Now, by contrast, the use of actuarial instruments has de-responsibilized the judge and
parole board member. Now they simply fill in a table, add a few numbers, and read the
answer. The judge is no longer an expert, but a mere scribe, a rapporteur. Others have
done the work and they have the expertise—the “actuarians,” as the state of Illinois
referred to them explicitly in the 1930s. This de-responsibilization is captured nowhere as
well as in a passage from the leading parole board authority’s Handbook for New Parole
Board Members: “The thing that keeps parole board members awake at night is the fear
that they will release someone and that person will commit a serious crime. . . .
Validated, actuarial risk assessment tools can significantly increase your ability to assess
risk more accurately” (2003, 35).
None of this fits well with the disciplinary model, and, for this reason, many have
been tempted to explore Foucault’s later lectures on biopolitics and governmentality. In
those lectures, delivered at the Collège de France between 1976 and 1979, Foucault
began to sketch a theoretical framework that revolved around the idea of “sécurité”—
which he later renamed “governmentality”—and populations, a framework that seemed
to apply better to the emerging practices of selective incapacitation. It was focused on
populations rather than the individual. Foucault played with a number of different
illustrations to distinguish the concept of governmentality from that of discipline, none
better though than the example of the different responses to epidemics over the centuries:
while the juridical model of exclusion was reflected in the exclusion of lepers in the
Middle Ages, and the disciplinary model of control was reflected in the regimentation of
the plague in the 16th and 17th centuries, the biopolitical model of population management
is reflected in the administrative apparatus applied to the outbreak of smallpox beginning
in the 18th century. This last model—a type of the larger category of governmentality—
manifested itself “completely differently” and in the following terms: “not so much to
impose a discipline, though there is some recourse to that, but rather to count how many
people have smallpox, at what age and with what effects, what mortality, what lesions,
what consequences, what risks we take with inoculation, what is the probability that an
individual might die or get smallpox despite being inoculated, what are the statistical
effects on the population in general” (Foucault 2004a, 12).
The concept of governmentality that Foucault began to sketch in his lectures has
been elaborated since the 1990s by a number of critical theorists (see, e.g., Rose and
Miller 1992; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991) and continues to guide critical work
today. Giorgio Agamben made fruitful use of the model of biopolitics—as a form of
governmentality—in Homo Sacer (1998), where he describes how political regimes
measure, control, regulate, and manipulate populations from the perspective of bare
life—of mere physical existence. In their discussion of the “new penology,” Malcolm
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Feeley and Jonathan Simon locate the actuarial precisely within the governmentality
paradigm (Feeley and Simon 1992, 450 and 452).
Ariela Gross rightly draws on the governmentality framework, suggesting that the
engineers of the actuarial may not in fact be focused on individual correction and
rehabilitation, nor on crime reduction and deterrence, but instead merely on managing
and counting populations (Gross 2007, __). These elements of the actuarial do indeed
lend themselves to the idea of governmentality—of regulating populations, not individual
souls, of securitizing, neutralizing, documenting, and controlling large groups of persons.
But the focus on populations rather than individuals misses one of the central dimensions
of the actuarial—namely, the desire to individualize the prediction and reduce false
positives, to determine whether this particular offender is likely to reoffend, is a
dangerous person, is a violent sexual predator. It is the specific and particular sexual
offender across the street from you, living in that apartment or house that you can see
through your window, that we must identify, document, publicize, and contain or
exclude. To be sure, the extent of this individualizing impulse to predict better may
resonate more in some contexts than in others—in the case of sexual predators, for
example, as well as parole releases, IRS audits, and federal sentencing. Gross’s
contribution is precisely to question how well it resonates in the case of racial profiling
and to ask whether the individualizing impulse is performed differently with regard to
young men of color. This is an important corrective and it suggests that we may need to
individualize our own analysis of the different tools and actuarial techniques. But there
remains, to my mind, an important disjuncture between these actuarial impulses and the
idea of simply managing populations. The desire to predict, especially the desire to
minimize false positives, remains an individualizing impulse.
As a result, I have not found it especially helpful to deploy either Foucault’s
disciplinary or governmentality frameworks. The mixing and matching of these different
lenses—and the inherent contradictions—do not advance our understanding of the
actuarial turn. This is why I thought it better, this time around, to rely instead on the
overarching theoretical framework of the will to knowledge. In this project I thus
explored the set of concrete desires that I see reflected in the actuarial turn: the desire to
know the criminal, the urge to categorize, and the impulse to insure. It is these concrete
desires and impulses that help make better sense of the embrace of actuarial instruments.
The desire to count, to predict, to know—the desire, in Hacking’s words, to tame
chance—reflects precisely the desire to control the future by knowing individuals.
In this sense, the theoretical intervention in Against Prediction draws importantly
on the broader poststructuralist insight regarding power/knowledge (see generally
Harcourt 2007b), as well as on the writings of Ian Hacking (1990) and Nikolas Rose
(2002) and the idea of taming chance—the idea of using probabilistic methods to control
the individual and shape the future (Harcourt 2007a, 41-45).8 Like Mariana Valverde
(2007, 160), my approach contests the idea that governmentality is a new mode of
governance that, in an epochal or evolutionary way, has displaced discipline. Discipline
8
It also draws, in the more specific discussion of the urge to insure, on the work of Tom Baker and Jonathan Simon (2002) who
are continuing to explore notions of risk and insurance (Harcourt 2007a, 185).
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and governmentality coexist—along with other forms of governance such as biopolitics
and sovereignty (see Harcourt 2001:149-150). Unlike Valverde, though, my approach
emphasizes the larger power/knowledge dimension and, especially, the ‘will to know’
project that others, such as Hacking, have emphasized in their writings. Resisting the
invitations of Sapir and Gross to place the actuarial within the logic of either discipline or
governmentality, I contend that the broader genealogical enterprise at the core of
poststructuralism offers a powerful lens in the study of punishment practices. In the
context of the actuarial turn, it raises the following set of questions: how did we come to
believe that predictions of future dangerousness are the proper basis for administering
just punishment and at what cost to society and the contemporary subject?
Two final points. First, Sapir is undoubtedly right that clinical prediction—which
was more closely tied to Foucauldian discipline—operates in a similar way as actuarial
prediction. There is no operative distinction between the two for purposes of my three
critiques, so long as the clinical judgment depends on group offending differentials—
which is most often the case. If this condition is met, both clinical judgment and actuarial
instruments will have similar effects in terms of potential inefficiency, the ratchet effect,
and distorting our conceptions of just punishment. The condition, though, is very
important. The key point that motivates the three critiques is that the profiling methods
are based on differences in group offending rates.
Finally, Gross asks at the end of her essay what is wrong with the fact that these
prediction tools may have been developed in the social sciences, outside the legal realm
(Gross 2007, __). My critique does, indeed, betray a certain amount of optimism about
the legal realm, as if only home-spun ideas of justice could possibly be right. My concern
about exogenous influence, though, does not stem from privileging one discipline over
the other, but from trepidations regarding the importing and exporting of ideas.
Discourses in all disciplines develop resistance and counter-resistance through multidimensional processes that involve the contestation and challenging of ideas. (The three
review essays here are a prime example!) Implants and transplants, in contrast, often take
place without that same resistance. They often travel without their critiques. Sapir says
this best when he notes that “One sense in which the Americanization tendency is
disturbing, is that often ideas and policies travel, but their important critiques stay home”
(Sapir 2007, __). That is precisely why the exogenous shock of actuarial instruments
seems problematic to me. The prediction instruments were embraced in the law, but the
skepticism and critiques stayed at home.

II. Clarifying Three Larger Structural Matters in Against Prediction
The three review essays also raise larger questions about the overall argument in
Against Prediction. Having revisited the specific critiques in detail, I turn now to these
structural matters.
A. The Accuracy of Actuarial Instruments
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Sapir remarks, correctly, that Against Prediction “does not challenge the
assumption that prediction actually works” (Sapir 2007, __). This raises an important
structural issue: the entire argument in Against Prediction is premised on one central
assumption, namely that the actuarial methods developed over the past century and now
being utilized predict accurately.
Now as I mention in Against Prediction, there are significant questions about the
reliability and validity of even the most popular actuarial instruments (Harcourt 2007a,
82-83). Inter-rater consistency scores are often low, as are some validation findings on
subsequent samples. Even some of the staunchest supporters of actuarial instruments are
not always particularly sanguine (Monahan and Swanson 2007).
No doubt, another book of the same title could be written challenging the
assumption of accuracy. That, however, would be a different book, and it would not need
to address efficiency arguments or selective incapacitation: if the instruments are not
accurate, there is no possible argument for their use. In this book, I intentionally assumed
that the instruments work in order to engage the very strongest arguments for prediction.
Against Prediction joins issue at the very heart of the actuarial turn.9
B. The Relationship Between the Three Critiques
Margalioth also raises an important structural point. He emphasizes that the first
two critiques are mutually exclusive, and that, together, they are in sharp tension with the
third. How can we assume, for purposes of the first critique, that individuals are
responsive to policing, but reject, for purposes of the second critique, all rational choice
assumptions? Moreover, if we do adopt an efficiency-based cost-benefit approach in the
first two critiques and “if such an optimal policy calls for the use of profiling,” then,
Margalioth asks, “why should ‘our conception of just punishment’ matter?” (Margalioth
2007, __). How do the three critiques function together?
This is an excellent question and it calls for a very precise, though somewhat
technical answer. In Against Prediction, I offer two immanent critiques of the two
leading arguments for the use of actuarial methods—the arguments from efficiency and
selective incapacitation—in order to motivate a genealogical power/knowledge critique
that explores how we have come to embrace the actuarial despite its likely failures, and at
what cost. This is a mouth-full, I confess, but it is the most accurate presentation of the
book.
The first and second critiques are indeed mutually exclusive, but not by accident.
They rely on contradictory assumptions about human action precisely because they
respond to the two strongest arguments for profiling—namely, the efficiency and the
selective incapacitation arguments. These two strongest arguments for profiling are
9
Incidentally, this also explains why the book focuses on actuarial prediction rather than clinical judgment (although I do discuss
at length the clinical school shooter profile at Harcourt 2007, 291 n.117).There is a general perception today in the United States that
actuarial instruments are far more accurate and useful than clinical predictions. This is not the case in other countries. Canada, for
instance, still relies more heavily on clinical models, though the actuarial is on the rise (Vacheret 2005).
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themselves mutually exclusive: if rational choice assumptions do in fact hold, as per the
efficiency argument, then profiling will eliminate all offending disparities and there will
be no selective incapacitation to be had. The two principal arguments for profiling
themselves rest on incompatible assumptions, and as a result the inverse is true as well: if
we assume elasticity, profiling will eliminate any offending differentials and thereby
eliminate the possibility of a ratchet effect. In this sense, the first two internal critiques—
just like the two strongest arguments for profiling—work as critiques “in the alternative.”
Together, the first two critiques motivate the third, more fundamental
genealogical inquiry: Why have we come to embrace the actuarial turn despite these
flaws in the arguments? Why do so many believe the efficiency claim despite the lack of
any evidence regarding comparative elasticities? Why has no one even raised the issue of
comparative elasticities until now? And why have we failed to appreciate the devastating
consequences of a potential ratchet effect? The answers to these questions thus form the
basis of the third critique: we have embraced the actuarial turn, I suggest, because of our
desire to know the criminal, to categorize and insure against future risk. The intense
desire for certainty has rendered these actuarial techniques irresistibly seductive—with
devastating consequences for the core principle of equal treatment at the heart of just
punishment.10
In sum, the three critiques do work together, but not in classical harmony. The
first two internal critiques motivate the third and most important intervention.
C. On Race and Prediction
One final major structural issue has to do with the role of race in Against
Prediction. To drive home a central point of the book—namely that the mathematical and
cost-benefit problems potentially plague all actuarial methods, not just racial profiling—I
made the ill-advised and simplifying claim that the problem with racial profiling is not
race, but profiling. I was trying to move the racial profiling debate from the issue of
racism to the question of profiling. In her review essay, Gross argues that “Although
Harcourt insists at the outset that he is telling us a story that is distinct from race—‘the
problem . . . is about the profiling, not race’—I came away from his book convinced that
we should tell this as a racial history as well” (Gross 2007, __). Gross sketches a number
of fruitful directions in which a racial history could go, concluding that “A study of
criminology and criminal justice practices in the United States simply cannot be divorced
or disentangled from the history of racial subordination” (Gross:2007:__).
Gross is right and race does indeed play a key and disturbing role in the history of
the actuarial. The first parole prediction instrument, developed in 1927 by Ernest
Burgess, included the race/nationality of the father as one of twenty-one factors that
predicted success or failure on parole (Harcourt 2007a, 57). Burgess’ model was
implemented by the Illinois Board of Paroles in 1933 and, as a result, race was used
10
At the 2007 Berlin meeting of the Law & Society Association, Pat O’Malley asked why the desire for certainty had taken the
shape it had—this embrace of actuarial methods. The answer is complex but, I would suggest, it is integrally tied to our late-modern
condition, one where rational explanations, social science, and economic ideology have gained ascendance. O’Malley also emphasized
the political dimensions of this, of which I have no doubt. A whole other book—a fascinating book—could be written on the topic.
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expressly as one factor in the “prognasio” that served as the basis for the decision
whether or not to parole an inmate. This continued for many decades. In fact, when
California began using a parole prediction instrument in the 1970s, it used an actuarial
device that relied on race. The first California “Base/Expectancy Score” narrowed in on
race and only three other factors—prior commitments, offense type, and number of
escapes (Simon 1993, 173). There is no doubt, also, that race motivates our discomfort
with racial profiling.
Perhaps a much better way to frame the issue of race, then, is not to extricate it
from the racial profiling equation, but instead to borrow from Lani Guinier and Gerald
Torres’ metaphor of the miner’s canary (Guinier and Torres 2002). Just like the canary,
whose distress is a warning that the air in the mine is poisoned, the troubling aspect of
race in the debate over racial profiling points to the larger problems of profiling for all
groups. Race is the first place where we see the poison, but it is a poison that affects
everyone else.
Let me close then by reframing the point. The problems with racial profiling
involve both race and profiling. Like the canary in the coal mine, the trouble surrounding
racial profiling alerts us to other problems with the use of actuarial methods more
generally. The mathematics of profiling and the overlooked detrimental costs to the
profiled populations affect all profiling techniques, whether they focus on race or
recidivism, gender or sexual orientation, national origin, or other classifications. We may,
as a society, decide to apply less scrutiny to some of these classifications than to others,
but the effects are the same. It is for this reason that the critiques of profiling are so
relevant today, post 9/11, in a world in which we may increasingly police and punish on
the basis of religious affiliation or national origin (Harcourt 2007d).
Conclusion
Thanks to Gross, Margalioth, and Sapir, I can now reformulate with greater
precision the three critiques that I presented in Against Prediction. First, the actuarial
methods developed over the twentieth century and being used today rely exclusively on
differences in offending rates and do not take account of the comparative elasticities of
the different populations. Because members of different populations may in fact respond
differently to policing and punishment, the use of existing profiling techniques may
actually increase overall offending in society. If we had perfect knowledge of
comparative elasticities and offending rates, then we could administer statistical
discrimination in a perfectly efficient manner. But that is neither realistic nor likely in
this lifetime.
Second, if we assume that people are perfectly inelastic to policing, the use of
existing profiling techniques will cause a ratchet effect on the targeted population with
devastating consequences on their employment, education, family, and other social
outcomes. These are costs that are often ignored because the targeted individuals are
criminally culpable. They are, however, costs that often overwhelm any benefits
associated with actuarial methods. Selective incapacitation—as one underlying theory of
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punishment that might justify a ratchet effect—is also problematic because it does not
treat similarly-situated offenders equally, but instead uses membership in racial, gender,
or other groups as a way to determine who is similarly situated.
Finally, and most importantly, if rational choice theorists are wrong to extol the
virtues of profiling and if proponents of selective incapacitation have failed to appreciate
the devastating consequences on profiled populations, then why have so many people
come to embrace the actuarial turn—with the limited exception of racial profiling? The
reason, I suggest, traces to our deep desire to know, our urge to categorize, and our
impulse to insure against risk. We have been seduced by these techniques, driven by our
desire for certainty—at the expense of fundamental notions of just punishment. Although
the actuarial turn fits uncomfortably within the two leading paradigms of Foucauldian
thought—discipline and governmentality—the actuarial can be profitably understood
through a will to knowledge lens. These desires to know the criminal, to categorize, and
to insure are what fuel our continued and misguided quest to predict deviance.
It is for these reasons that I remain against prediction.
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